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  <title>Cyber Sec — Articles</title>
  <subtitle>Vulnerability research, red team operations, detection engineering and security tooling. Authorized, evidence-based security work.</subtitle>
  <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/" />
  <link rel="self" href="https://cybersec.org.za/feed.xml" />
  <updated>2026-08-31T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
  <id>https://cybersec.org.za/feed.xml</id>
  <author><name>Stephan Botes</name><email>stephanbotesIT@proton.me</email></author>
  <entry>
    <title>Can 2FA Replace Passwords? Double 8-Digit TOTP, Stress-Tested</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-passwordless-double-totp.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-passwordless-double-totp.html</id>
    <published>2026-08-31T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-08-31T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>Two 30-second 8-digit 2FA codes instead of a password: the brute-force math, the fail-anywhere-restart rule, and the honest gaps. Feasibility research from Cyber Sec.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Dynamic Context Runtime: Bounded Attention over Unbounded History</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/research-dcr-bounded-attention.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/research-dcr-bounded-attention.html</id>
    <published>2026-08-21T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-08-21T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>A runtime that separates unbounded history from bounded attention: a representation ladder, a provenance graph, and a budgeted context planner. Measured at 145 tokens per query over a 27,362-token transcript, flat across 33x history growth.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Rise in Ransomware Targeting Healthcare</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-ransomware-healthcare.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-ransomware-healthcare.html</id>
    <published>2026-07-01T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-07-01T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>Why healthcare keeps getting hit, how these intrusions actually unfold from initial access to double extortion, and the controls that break the chain.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>How to Triage a Critical CVE</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-critical-cve-triage.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-critical-cve-triage.html</id>
    <published>2026-06-25T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-06-25T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>A new critical CVE drops and everyone panics. A calm, repeatable playbook for deciding whether it's actually your emergency — exposure, exploitability, and smart patching.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Reverse-Engineering an Enterprise VPN Client</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-reverse-engineering-vpn.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-reverse-engineering-vpn.html</id>
    <published>2026-06-09T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-06-09T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>A field methodology for tearing down a privileged VPN client — static triage, dynamic observation, the authentication handshake, the IPC privilege boundary, and responsible disclosure.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Building a Detection Engineering Program</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-detection-engineering-program.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-detection-engineering-program.html</id>
    <published>2026-05-28T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-05-28T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>From raw logs to alerts that actually fire — a threat-driven, build-and-own approach to detection engineering with Wazuh/Elastic, detection-as-code, and validation.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Building Memory-Safe Offensive Tooling in Rust</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-rust-offensive-tooling.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-rust-offensive-tooling.html</id>
    <published>2026-05-12T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-05-12T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>Why we write offensive security tooling in Rust — memory safety, fearless concurrency, single static binaries, and the patterns that keep custom tools reliable under fire during an engagement.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>State-Sponsored Threat Actor Patterns</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-apt-threat-actor-patterns.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-apt-threat-actor-patterns.html</id>
    <published>2026-04-20T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-04-20T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>How nation-state operators differ from commodity criminals — initial access, living off the land, persistence, and long dwell time — and what it means for your defenses.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Incident Response Tabletop Exercises</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-ir-tabletop-exercises.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-ir-tabletop-exercises.html</id>
    <published>2026-04-08T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-04-08T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>Your incident-response plan is a hypothesis until someone tests it. How to run a tabletop that surfaces decision and communication gaps — with four ready-to-run scenarios.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Supply Chain Security Assessment Framework</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-supply-chain-assessment.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-supply-chain-assessment.html</id>
    <published>2026-03-22T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-03-22T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>A vendor-agnostic method for evaluating third-party and dependency risk — inventory and SBOM, build provenance, dependency review, and appliance testing with reproducible evidence.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Beyond the Scanner: Why Manual Penetration Testing Matters</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-beyond-the-scanner.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-beyond-the-scanner.html</id>
    <published>2026-03-05T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-03-05T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>Automated scanners find the known; attackers exploit the unknown. Why business-logic flaws, chained exploits, and real impact only surface with a human tester in the loop.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Red Team Operations Playbook</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-red-team-playbook.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-red-team-playbook.html</id>
    <published>2026-02-18T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-02-18T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>How to plan, run, and actually learn from a red team engagement — objective-driven adversary emulation, rules of engagement, and the purple-team turn that tunes your detections.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Compliance to Security: Bridging the Gap</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-compliance-to-security.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-compliance-to-security.html</id>
    <published>2026-02-10T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-02-10T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>A clean audit is not a secure system. How to turn a compliance checkbox into real resilience — threat-model your environment, test like an attacker, and fix root causes.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The 2026 Enterprise Security Landscape</title>
    <link href="https://cybersec.org.za/article-2026-security-landscape.html" />
    <id>https://cybersec.org.za/article-2026-security-landscape.html</id>
    <published>2026-01-15T00:00:00+02:00</published>
    <updated>2026-01-15T00:00:00+02:00</updated>
    <summary>The trends that actually moved enterprise risk in 2026 — identity-first attacks, exposed edge appliances, ransomware-as-a-service, and supply-chain exposure — with the defensive priorities that matter.</summary>
  </entry>
</feed>
